A large chunk of the arguments centers around whether the fetus is considered a person and what rights that person has in comparison to the rights of the woman carrying the child. Pro-lifers tend to argue that a person is a person from the moment of conception and, thus, a fetus has a right to life.
Granted that the fetus is a person, the extremist pro-life view would state that abortion is thus never permissible because the baby has a right to life. Thomson argues that most people would say no. Instead, it is debated whether a third party should be permitted to perform abortions. Thomson proposes that while a third person is within their right to object to intervene, they cannot prevent the woman from acting.
If nothing is done, you will be crushed to death in a matter of minutes. To prevent a woman from getting a life-saving abortion would be to insist she wait passively for death within her own home. The right to life allegedly prohibits abortion, yet the term is never defined. However, both these functional meanings break down upon closer inspection. While it would be nice of him to do so, no one would argue that I have a right to have President Obama flown to my hospital room to bestow upon me his healing touch.
Therefore, abortion would be permissible in cases where the pregnancy would be fatal or the woman did not voluntarily grant the fetus the use of her body. Her paper is remembered and cited today because of her vivid and succinct comparisons and hypotheticals used to make her points.
Furthermore, she brought attention to a previously ignored logical gap. Abortion is discussed not only morally but legally as well.
Only after we make a moral decision about a non-abortion case does she examine the implications for abortion. Analogy 1 Pregnancy due to rape. Kidnapped, you wake up and find that you are connected to a famous violinist, who needs your kidneys for the next 9 months. Although the violinist is an innocent person with a right to life, separating yourself would kill the violinist. Yet it would be moral to "unplug" yourself, even if it means the death of the violinist.
If you didn't consent to supporting the violinist for 9 months, you don't have an obligation to do so. Moral conclusion: the violinist's right to life does not give the violinist a right to your body. Similarly, pregnancy due to rape is an unjust relationship, and a woman does not have an obligation to carry the fetus to term, and the fetus' right to life is not enough to require continuation of the pregnancy.
Analogy 2 carrying fetus to term will kill the mother. Same as 1, but the strain on your kidneys will kill you within a month. Your own right to life gives you the moral right to unplug yourself if your life is threatened. Similarly, if both the woman and the fetus have a right to life, then the woman's right to life gives her the right to end a pregnancy that threatens her own life. Analogy 3 Ectopic pregnancy.
You are trapped in a tiny, tiny house with a rapidly expanding child, whose growth will crush you. Yet, should you choose to defend your right to life, it is morally permissible to kill this child to save your own life. Moral conclusion: directly killing an innocent person is sometimes moral. Similarly, directly killing a fetus can sometimes be justified. The extreme view, which would forbid all abortion, is mistaken. Analogy 4 the issue of third party impartiality.
Jones has put on a coat, but will freeze to death if it is taken away. However, Smith will freeze to death if the coat is not given to Smith. Therefore 8 It is not morally right for a woman to abort a pregnancy due to rape. Premise 2 is undeniably true, as are premises 5 and 7. Now recall our all too brief logic lesson. If we have a valid argument with a false conclusion, at least one of the premisses must be false. But all the premisses except premise 4 are either clearly true or granted to be true for the sake of argument.
It follows that premise 4 must be false. That is to say, it is false that a fetus' right to life is more stringent than a mother's right to determine what happens in and to her body. As Thomson puts the point, "something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago. In order for Thomson's argument to work, however, it must be the case that disconnecting yourself from the famous violinist and a woman's aborting a pregnancy due to rape are similar in all morally relevant respects.
Let us compare the two:. The act of disconnecting yourself from the famous violinist. The act of a woman's aborting a pregnancy due to rape. Kidnapping is morally wrong. Rape is morally wrong. The hospital stay would last nine months. The pregnancy would last nine months. The violinist is an innocent human being. The fetus is an innocent human being. Disconnecting from the violinist amounts to killing the violinist. Aborting the pregnancy amounts to killing the fetus.
How they differ:. The famous violinist is famous and can play the violin. The fetus is neither famous nor can it play the violin. You may not be female. The woman is female. You cannot leave the hospital and so do not have freedom of movement. The woman has, for the most part, freedom of movement.
Disconnecting from the violinist is merely refusing to save. Aborting the pregnancy is actively killing the fetus. It seems, then, that the two actions are similar in all morally relevant respects. The Extreme View: Abortion is always impermissible, even to save the life of the mother. Therefore 5 No fetus may be killed.
Thomson considers each of the following arguments, but shows that each is unsound. First try: Directly killing an innocent person is morally impermissible. Therefore 5 No fetus may be killed unless its development threatens the pregnant woman's life and she performs the abortion. Smith has a prior claim to the coat, since it is his. Surely we would not be justified in saying: we can't make any decision between Smith and Jones as to who should have the coat. After all, Smith does have a prior claim to the coat.
Now suppose Jones overpowers Smith and takes his coat. Consider the following argument:. A 1 If Smith has a prior claim of ownership to his coat, then it is morally right for someone in authority to return Smith's coat. Therefore 3 It is morally right for someone other than Smith to return Smith's coat.
Therefore 3 It is morally wrong for anyone other than the pregnant woman to perform an abortion. C 1 PA: If one of any two actions which are similar in all morally relevant respects is morally right, then so is the other, and if one of any two actions which are similar in all morally relevant respects is morally wrong, then so is the other. Therefore 4 It is morally right for someone other than the pregnant woman to perform an abortion.
But notice that if so, then it's not the case that it is morally wrong for someone other than the pregnant woman to perform an abortion. So the conclusion of Argument B is false. But Argument B is valid, so at least one of its premises must be false. Since premise 2 of Argument B seems correct, it must be the case that premise 1 is false. That is to say, it is not the case that:. Therefore 5 No fetus may be killed unless its development threatens the pregnant woman's life.
Therefore 3 If x has a right to life, then x does not have the right to the use of another person's body and x does not have the right to the continued use of another person's body. Therefore 5 It is false that no fetus may be killed unless its development threatens the pregnant woman's life. Therefore 5 No fetus may be killed unjustly. Anti-abortionists are unjustly requiring women to be Good in some extreme cases Splendid Samaritans.
No one else is legally required to be even a Minimally Decent Samaritan, although they may be morally required. It seems that except in cases where we have assumed a special responsibility for someone, we are not morally required to make large sacrifices to keep another person alive. XX, No. Pecorino All Rights reserved. Web Surfer's Caveat: These are class notes, intended to comment on readings and amplify class discussion.
They should be read as such. They are not intended for publication or general distribution. Return to: Table of Contents for the Online Textbook.
Today we completed our discussion of Noonan and turned to Thomson.
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